










The Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE) was 
established in 1991.  CHERE is a centre of excellence in health economics and 
health services research. It is a joint Centre of the Faculties of Business 
and Nursing, Midwifery and Health at the University of Technology, Sydney, in 
collaboration with Central Sydney Area Health Service. It was established as a 
UTS Centre in February, 2002. The Centre aims to contribute to the development 
and application of health economics and health services research through 
research, teaching and policy support. CHERE’s research program encompasses 
both the theory and application of health economics. The main theoretical 
research theme pursues valuing benefits, including understanding what 
individuals value from health and health care, how such values should be 
measured, and exploring the social values attached to these benefits. The 
applied research  focuses on economic and the appraisal of new programs or new 
ways of delivering and/or funding services. CHERE’s teaching includes 
introducing clinicians, health services managers, public health professionals 
and others to health economic principles. Training programs aim to develop 
practical skills in health economics and health services research. Policy 
support is provided at all levels of the health care system by undertaking 
commissioned projects, through the provision of formal and informal advice as 
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The percentage of Australians taking up Private Health Insurance (PHI) was in decline 
following  the  introduction  of  Medicare  in  1984  (PHIAC).  To  arrest  this  decline  the 
Australian Government introduced a suite of policies, between 1997 and 2000, to create 
incentives for Australians to purchase private health insurance. These policies include an 
increased Medicare levy for those without PHI on high incomes, introduced in 1997, a 
30% rebate for private hospital cover (introduced 1998), and the Lifetime Health Cover 
(LHC) policy where PHI premiums are set at age of entry, increasing for each year older 
than 30 years (introduced 2000). In 2004 the longitudinal study on Household Income 
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA), included a series of questions on private 
health  insurance  and  hospital  use.  We  used  the  HILDA  data  to  investigate  the 
demographic, health and income factors related to the PHI decisions, especially around 
the introduction of the Lifetime Health Cover policy. Specifically we investigate who was 
most influenced to purchase PHI (specifically hospital cover) in 2000 as a response to the 
Lifetime  Health  Cover  policy  deadline.  Are  those  who  have  joined  PHI  since  the 
introduction  of  LHC  different  from  those  who  joined  prior  to  LHC?  What  are  the 
characteristics of those who have dropped PHI since the introduction of LHC? We model 
the  PHI  outcomes  allowing  for  heterogeneity  of  choice  and  correlation  across 
alternatives.  After controlling for other factors, we find that LHC prompted moderately 
well-off working age adults (30-49 yrs) to purchase before the 2000 deadline. Young 
singles or couples with no children, and the overseas born were more likely to purchase 
since 2000, while the relatively less well-off continue to drop PHI in spite of current 
policy incentives.  
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1. Introduction 
The universal Australian public health care system, Medicare, was introduced in 
1984. Subsequently the private health insurance coverage of the population fell 
steadily, reaching its lowest level of just over thirty percent in 1998. Governments of 
both political persuasions at the Commonwealth level, argued that if the decline of 
private health insurance was to continue it would place unacceptable pressure on 
public hospitals in the future. Therefore over the last decade the Commonwealth 
introduced a suite of policies to create incentives for Australians to purchase private 
health insurance with the aim of promoting choice and relieving pressure on the 
public hospital system.  
In 1997, the government introduced a private insurance tax rebate for low income 
singles and families and a tax surcharge (one percent of taxable income) for those on 
high incomes. The tax surcharge could be avoided by purchasing private health 
insurance. In 1999, the income-tested rebate for low earners was replaced with a 
constant thirty percent premium rebate, available to all regardless of income. In 2000, 
the Lifetime Health Cover policy (LHC) reform introduced an age gradient into the 
premium schedule. After July 15, 2000, all new private insurance enrollees aged over 
30 pay a premium loading in future period of two percent for each year of age over 30 
at entry. The loading is capped at 70 percent. Irrespective of age, people already 
insured prior to the deadline who maintain their private insurance coverage are 
exempt from the loading. The 2000 reform was accompanied by extensive publicly-
funded advertising under the theme “Run for Cover”. As a result of these insurance 
incentives, private insurance coverage in Australia increased from 30.1 percent in 
1998 to 43 percent in 2000, a jump of nearly 50 percent, most of which occurred just 
prior to July 2000.  There was also a change in the mix of the insured population with 
large fall in the percentage aged over 65. 
Three policies have remained relevant in 2000 and since: 
1)  the increased Medicare levy for ‘high income’ earners who did not purchase 
private hospital cover; 
2)  the 30%  rebate for the purchase of hospital cover; and 
3)  The Lifetime Health Cover policy.  
Previous Australian research on private health insurance falls into three categories: 
analysis of insurance demand prior to the reforms of the last decade; analyses of the 
PHI incentives overall; and analyses of the incentives that focuses on heterogeneity 
across individuals or families. 
The factors influencing the demand for private insurance coverage prior to LHC have 
been examined using the ABS National Health Surveys (NHS). Using the NHS 
surveys undertaken between 1983 and 1995, Schofield et al (1997) examine PHI the 
changing composition of PHI coverage of the population. They identify a decline 
among middle income families compared with both upper and lower income groups 
and a smaller decline among families headed by a person over 55 years old than 
younger families. They also find that rising premiums had the greatest impact on low 
income families. Using the 1989 and 1995 NHS data respectively, Savage and Wright 
(2003) and Barrett and Conlon (2003) found a strong association between demand for 
insurance and income. Savage and Wright also examined the association between  
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utilisation and insurance for private hospital length of stay.  They found that insurance 
could more than double the average length of private hospital stay.  
The introduction of the insurance incentives generated considerable research. Butler 
(2002) analysed the "carrots and sticks" financial incentives for PHI and found that 
the membership uptake that occurred was largely attributable to LHC, a policy that 
had virtually no cost to government. He also examined the changing age composition 
of the insured pool after September 2000, and observes that the increasing average 
age of those insured suggests the possible reappearance of an adverse selection 
dynamic. He argues that the 'trick' delivered by LHC may not be maintained in the 
longer term. Walker et al (2005) present an historical analysis of the impacts of the 
different PHI incentives in terms of the proportion of Australians having hospital 
insurance cover by age, gender and socioeconomic status. They found that the 
increased cover was due mainly to the richest 20% of the population. Among the 
poorest 40% the impact was minimal.  
Dawkins et al (2004) found strong evidence that households most affected by the PHI 
policy changes were those with high socio-economic standing and high income and 
little evidence that the policies alleviated the burden of public hospitals. Vaithianathan 
(2004) argues that the subsidy to health insurance should have been an effective 
means to increase PHI coverage, but was ineffective because community rating was 
ineffective. Despite community rating rules which prohibit age adjusted premiums, 
Household Expenditure Survey data indicate that young adults pay considerably less 
for their insurance than older adults. She concludes that insurers circumvented 
community rating through plan design, screening older consumers into more 
expensive plans. She also found that the penalty of 2 per cent per year for delaying 
insurance, introduced as part of the lifetime cover plan, is too low to be effective.  
Doiron et al (forthcoming) investigated the relationship between ex ante risk and 
private health insurance using the NHS 2001 and found a strong positive association 
between self-assessed health and private health cover and identify the factors 
responsible for favourable selection. They found that those persons who engage in 
risk-taking behaviours are simultaneously less likely to be in good health and less 
likely to buy insurance. 
Palangkaraya and Yong (2005) attempted to isolate the effects of the different 
insurance incentives using 1995 and 2001 NHS data. Focusing on single individuals 
their counterfactual analysis indicates that LHC caused between 42% and 75% of the 
overall increase in PHI membership. Ellis and Savage (2005) developed and used 
NHS 2001 data to estimate a model of individual decisions to enroll in private health 
insurance order to understand the effects of the PHI reforms on the age and income 
distribution of those with private cover over time. They conclude that the major 
impacts of the three reforms can be understood as a broad-based “Run for Cover”, a 
response to a deadline and an advertising blitz, rather than a pure price response. They 
also found that LHC would have had a larger impact on coverage for families without 
the 30% premium subsidy.   
Lu and Savage (2006) used the 2001 NHS to examine the impact of increased private 
insurance coverage on use of both public and private hospital systems focusing on 
how behaviour varies with insurance duration. They found that those who enrolled in 
response to the incentives behave more like the uninsured than the long-term insured.  
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While the insurance incentives substantially increased the proportion of the 
population with supplementary private insurance, the impact on the use of the public 
system by new entrants appears to be quite modest. They conclude that using financial 
PHI incentives is not a cost-effective way of reducing pressure on public hospital 
systems. 
Feibig et al 2007 analysed private health insurance behaviours among respondents to 
the 2001 NHS to identify insurance ‘types’ according to stated reasons for buying 
health insurance. They found considerable evidence of unexplained heterogeneity 
among the privately insured population and that insurance type is significantly 
associated with hospital utilisation, particularly the probability of being admitted as a 
public or private patient. The government’s insurance incentives were more attractive 
to particular types of the insured population and this limits their effectiveness in 
reducing pressure on the public hospital system. 
In this paper we use the HILDA data to further explore heterogeneity of private health 
insurance choices. We investigate demographic, family, health and income factors 
related to respondent’s private health insurance decisions in the light of recent policy 
changes. We focus on whether these policy changes attracted a different demographic 
to purchase private health insurance than previously. We are also interested in 
describing those who have dropped private health insurance since the introduction of 
LHC. Since the policies only apply to the purchase of hospital cover, we have 
excluded ancillary cover only from our definition of private health insurance. 
We identify six distinct groups: those who purchased private hospital cover before 
LHC; those who reported they took up private hospital cover in 2000 in response to 
the LHC deadline; those who took up private hospital cover after 2000 (i.e. after the 
LHC premiums were in place); those who dropped private hospital cover after 2000; 
those who had dropped private hospital cover prior to 2000 and remained uninsured; 
those who had never purchased private hospital cover. We model the insurance 
decisions using a multinomial probit model which allows for heterogeneity of choice 
and correlation across alternatives. We use our preferred model to simulate predicted 
probabilities for each alternative outcome. To illustrate our results we constructed a 
series of hypothetical index individuals for each outcome alternative of interest, 
setting the levels of the explanatory variables to give a high simulated probability of 
choice for that alternative. We then use the index individual as a base to examine the 
effect of a change in the level of each explanatory variable on the probability of 
choice for the alternative of interest, keeping all other variables at the level of the 
index individual.  
These results focus on the three groups whose decisions would be affected by 
Lifetime Health Cover: those who joined PHI because of the lifetime Health cover 
deadline, those who joined after the deadline and those who dropped hospital cover 
since the introduction of the policy. 
2. Data 
The Household Income and Labour Dynamics of Australia (HILDA) study is a 
longitudinal population survey which commenced in 2001. HILDA is a representative 
sample of Australian households. In the baseline 2001 survey all members of 7,682 
selected households were enumerated and members aged 15 years and over were  
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interviewed. Respondents have been followed across time and interviews are 
conducted every 12 months. New household members are included in subsequent 
interview waves, while ever they share a household with a baseline respondent. The 
survey covers questions on income, expenditures, education, occupation and other 
roles, demographics, health, family formation, risk behaviours, attitudes and life 
events.  The HILDA sample and method have been described in detail elsewhere 
(http://melbourneinstitute.com/hilda/). 
In Wave 4 of HILDA conducted in 2004 respondents were asked a series of questions 
on private health insurance and hospital usage. Did respondent currently have private 
health insurance? If yes, did it include hospital cover? When did he/she join? And if 
he/she joined in 2000 was that as a response to the LHC policy? If the respondent was 
not currently insured, had he/she ever had hospital cover in the past and if so how 
long ago did he/she drop hospital cover? 
From these questions we created six groups based on the respondent’s most recent 
decision in relation to the purchase of private hospital cover insurance. 
1.  Joined Prior: those who purchased private hospital cover before Lifetime 
Health Cover. 
2.  Joined because of Lifetime Health Cover (LHC): those who stated they took 
up private hospital cover in 2000 because of LHC.  
3.  Joined After: those who took up private hospital cover after 2000. 
4.  Left After: those who dropped private hospital cover after 2000. 
5.  Left Prior: those who had dropped private hospital cover before 2000, 
including those who still held extras cover. 
6.  Never: those who had never purchased private hospital cover, including those 
who had only ever held ancillary cover. 
Since the questions on private health insurance cover were only asked in Wave 4 of 
HILDA we adopted a retrospective cohort approach to model the factors related to 
private health insurance decisions. The outcome was most recent decision in relation 
to the purchase of private hospital cover insurance in Wave 4 of HILDA. The 
explanatory variables were responses recorded in Wave1 of HILDA. We chose Wave 
1 as the baseline because that was the closest time period to the 2000 policy changes 
and therefore was the best available measure of the respondent’s status at the time of 
the policy changes. In addition differences between Waves 1 and 2 in income, 
financial assets and health were calculated to measure the effect of prospective 
changes after 2001 on more recent decisions to purchase or drop private hospital 
cover after the introduction of LHC. 
Explanatory variables fall into five categories: 
1.  Demographic variables included age, sex, region of residence, education, 
occupation, country of birth and languages spoken other than English. Family 
formation variables included couple status, the number of respondent’s 
resident children < 25 years and the age of the youngest resident child. 
2.  Health variables included long-term illness or disability, the Short Form 
Health Survey (SF-36) items and scales, alcohol consumption, smoking status 
and exercise.  
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3.  Financial variables included individual, partners and household wages, 
benefits and financial assets, attitudes to financial risk and self-assessed 
prosperity.   
4.  Retrospective life events  in the 12 months prior to 2001 included self-report of 
financial improvement or worsening, losing a job, being promoted, changing 
jobs, retiring, marriage, separation, reconciliation, becoming pregnant, a new 
baby, injury or illness for self or family.  
5.  Prospective changes in the 12 months from 2001 to 2002 included personal 
and household income and financial assets, changes in disability/illness and 
SF-36 self-assessed health. 
In the analysis we used the balanced panel of respondents aged 18 years and over who 
had complete data for the relevant variables in Wave1 to Wave 4. There were 13,191 
respondents 18 years and over in Wave 1 of HILDA. The balanced panel aged 18 
years and over from Waves 1 to 4 comprised 9,377 respondents, 98% of whom 
answered the self-completion questionnaire in Wave1. Eight respondents did not 
answer the questions on private health insurance in Wave 4. This gave a final sample 
of 9,196. Half of the sample (49.6%) held private hospital insurance in 2004. A 
further 336 (3.6%) held ancillary cover only. A quarter of respondents (25.7%) had 
never held any private hospital cover. The private health insurance choice (hospital 
cover only) categories used in the analysis are shown in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 NEAR HERE 
The majority of respondents who had dropped private hospital cover by 2004 had 
done so 8 or more years ago (1779 of 2281). Of those who had dropped private 
hospital cover after 2000, half (219 of 424) had done so less than 2 years ago. A 
summary of the characteristics of the total sample and each choice category is shown 
in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 NEAR HERE 
Respondents with private hospital cover in 2004 were more likely in 2001 to have 
tertiary qualifications, to be living in a major city, to be a non-smoker and have higher 
average wages than those without insurance. A greater proportion of those who took 
up hospital cover in response to LHC policy were couples with children, compared to 
the other groups. Those who joined private hospital cover after 2000 had a marked 
increase in household wages from 2001 to 2002. In contrast those who dropped 
private hospital cover after 2000 had a marked decrease in household wages from 
2001 to 2002. 
3. Modelling strategy 
In order to examine the explanatory variables on PHI choice, assume that each 
individual has an unobserved utility associated with each of six discrete outcomes. 
Individuals then choose the alternative with the highest utility.  
With a linear random utility model this implies: 
  6 ,.., 1 ; ) 1 ( = + ¢ = j x U ij j i ij e b    
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where x represents the vector of control variables. Under the assumption that the 
disturbances are distributed as iid type I extreme value, this random utility framework 
motivates the use of the multinomial logit model. Initially STATA was used to fit a 
multinomial logit model with the six PHI categories as the outcome. 
All explanatory variables were fitted in the full model in groups of related variables, 
specifically demographics, relationship and family formation, education and 
occupation, health, wages, benefits and financial assets, health risk and financial risk, 
retrospective self-reported life changes, prospective changes in income and financial 
assets.  
The number of variables in the model from each group of explanatory variables was 
reduced using backward elimination from the full model. The objective was to retain 
in the model those variables from each group with the greatest explanatory power, 
without omitting any important variables from the model. Each group of explanatory 
variables was reduced in the presence of all other variables, starting with the least 
significant variable in the group. A variable was kept or dropped based on the 
likelihood ratio test (alpha = .05) and the next least significant variable was tested and 
so on. After all variables had been tested, the next family was then reduced the same 
way. Age, sex, health and income are all known important explanatory variables for 
health insurance behaviour. Therefore appropriate measure(s) of each of these 
characteristics were kept in the model regardless of their significance in the sample.  
The final model was tested for adequacy against the full model using the likelihood 
ratio test. To ensure that no important explanatory variables had been omitted from 
the model, the coefficients in the final model were compared with the full model for 
any substantial changes in size. 
The final model was tested for the assumption of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, using formal tests and by running a series of binary logit models of each 
alternative outcome against the reference outcome “never had private health 
insurance” to check any changes in the coefficients. 
The variables retained in the final model were age, sex, partner status, number of 
children, age of youngest child, occupation, education, language, country of birth, 
region of residence, self-assessed health, disability or long-term illness, smoking 
status, weekly exercise, individual wages, benefits and financial assets, partner’s 
wages and financial assets, total household wages, self-reported prosperity and 
attitude to financial risk, recent loss of job, recent illness or disability in the family, 
recent worsening of financial situation, recently married, prospective changes in 
household wages, benefits and financial assets. 
Variables in the final model were inspected for functional form. Age was non-linear 
on the logit for the alternatives “joined because of lifetime health cover” and “joined 
after lifetime health cover”. Age was therefore entered as spline variables with break-
points at age 31, 46 and 66 to capture the age-related effects of the LHC policy. 
Increasing positive financial assets and increasing negative financial assets predicted a 
greater probability of having private health insurance relative to no financial assets. 
Therefore to capture this non-linear relationship, financial assets was fitted as two 
ordinal variables, positive financial assets with 6 ordinal categories ($0 to $9999, 
$10,000 to $19,999,…..,$40,000 to $49,999, $50,000 and above) and negative 
financial assets with 2 ordinal categories (< -$10,000, $0 to -$9999).   
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Smoking status that was missing for Wave1 was imputed from later waves of the 
panel where possible. There were 510 observations with incomplete data that were 
omitted from the model (5.5% of the balanced panel). The number of complete cases 
in the final multinomial logit model was 8,686. 
The final multinomial logit model failed the test for independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) (Small-Hsiao test, p<.001). Therefore we investigated models that 
relaxed the IIA assumption using the “mdc” procedure in SAS V9.1.  We chose a 
multinomial probit model that assumes the error term  ij e  for each alternative is 
normally distributed, but allows error terms to be heteroskedastic and correlated 
across alternatives. Two multinomial probit models were fitted and compared: 
1.  An approximation to multinomial logit with restrictions on the error terms to 
be homoskedastic and uncorrelated across alternatives. 
2.  The unrestricted multinomial probit model  that allowed the error terms to be 
heteroskedastic and freely correlated across alternatives.  
The fit of the unrestricted model was compared to the fit of the model with 
homoskedastic variance and uncorrelated error terms, using the likelihood ratio test. 
The final preferred model was used to simulate predicted probabilities for each 
alternative for each respondent. A dataset was created with hypothetical observations 
to observe the effect of changing levels of each explanatory variable on the estimated 
probability of the alternative outcomes.  
A series of index individuals were created, one for each outcome alternative, as a base 
to examine the effects of each explanatory variable on the probability of that 
particular outcome. The model coefficients were used to select levels of the 
explanatory to create an individual with a high probability for a particular outcome. 
The explanatory variables were then varied one level at a time to estimate their effects 
on the probability of the alternative of interest, keeping all other variables at the level 
of the index individual. Index individuals were created for the three alternatives of 
most interest; purchasing hospital cover because of lifetime health cover, joining after 
2000, and leaving after 2000. 
The effects of age were estimated holding all other explanatory variables at the level 
of the sample mean. 
4. Results 
The goodness of fit of the multinomial logit and multinomial probit models are 
summarised in Table 3. The unrestricted multinomial probit fitted the data better than 
the multinomial probit model with homoskedastic independent error terms (LR chisq 
(64, 14)  p < .0001). We therefore proceeded with the unrestricted multinomial probit 
as the preferred model for the analysis. 
TABLE 3 NEAR HERE 
The characteristics of the three index individuals are summarised in Table 4 along 
with their predicted probabilities for each choice alternative.  
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TABLE 4 NEAR HERE 
Joined because of LHC 
The index individual for joining private health insurance because of Lifetime Health 
Cover was a 40 year old married man with one child aged 5-14 years, a non-smoker 
with no long-term health conditions, in a professional position with tertiary 
qualifications, with an annual wage of $100,000, whose partner is not working and 
with no financial assets. The full details of the LHC index individual are listed in 
Table 4. The estimated probability of joining because of LHC for the index individual 
is 38%, much higher than the overall sample rate of 6%. The probability of joining 
prior is also higher for this individual than for the sample rate (55% versus 39%). 
 
TABLE 5 NEAR HERE 
The effect of age on the probability of joining because of LHC holding all other 
variables at the sample mean, are shown in Figure 1 and the effects of changing the 
levels of the index individual  are shown in Table 5. To provide a comparison with 
those who joined prior Table 5 also shows the changes in probability of having joined 
prior for each change in the level of the LHC index individual. 
 
In summary based on the index individual characteristics associated with an increased 
probability of having purchased private hospital cover in 2000:  
¾  Being aged 31-45 years 
¾  Having 1 school-aged child 
¾  A single income between $60k and $120k 
¾  No financial assets 
¾  Described their financial circumstances as “just getting by” 
¾  Family member had had a recent injury or illness  
¾  Were born in Australia from a Non-English speaking background or born in 
Asia/Pacific region 
 
Being recently married, higher partner’s wages and higher financial assets reduced the 
probability of joining because of LHC deadline relative to having already joined 
before the introduction of the LHC policy. Having a larger younger family also 
decreased the probability of joining because of the LHC deadline relative to having 
already joined prior.  
Variables that did not affect the probability of joining because of LHC, included 
smoking status, having a long term disability or health problem, occupation or 
qualifications, reporting being financially worse in the 12 months prior to 2001, or 
any changes in income or financial assets following 2001.  
Joined After 2000 
The index individual for joining private hospital cover after the introduction of 
Lifetime Health Cover (Joined After 2000) was a 29 year old male with partner and 
no children, a non-smoker, with no long-term health conditions, in a professional 
occupation. The full details of the Joined After index individual are listed in Table 4. 
The estimated probability of having joined after 2000 for the index individual is 41%.   
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The effect of age on the probability of joining after 2000 holding all other variables at 
the sample mean, are shown in Figure 2 and marginal changes based on the index 
individual are shown in Table 6.  
 
In summary based on the index individual the following characteristics were 
associated with an increased probability of having purchased private hospital cover 
after 2000: 
¾  Turning 30 years of age after 2000, 
¾  Being single or in a couple with no children in 2001 
¾  Having no financial assets in 2001 
¾  Not becoming financially worse-off in 2001 
¾  Having no increase in benefits from 2001 to 2002 
¾  Being from a non-English speaking background and/or born overseas 
¾  Having a long-term illness or disability  
 
Variables with negligible effect on joining private hospital cover after 2000 included 
smoking status, region of residence, having a family member with a recent illness or 
disability and changes in financial assets after 2001. 
Left After 2000 
The index individual for leaving private hospital cover after the introduction of the 
lifetime health cover policy is a 35 year old female, in a working couple with 3 
children, the youngest under 5 years old. She smokes regularly and has no long-term 
illness or disability. Her individual wages are $50,000 and her partner’s wages are 
$70,000. The full details of the index individual are shown in Table 4. The estimated 
probability of the index individual being in the group that left private hospital cover 
after 2000 is 46%. 
Figure 3 shows the effect of age on leaving hospital cover after 2000, with all other 
variables held at the sample mean. Effects based on the index individual are shown in 
Table 7.  
In summary based on the index individual the following characteristics were 
associated with an increased probability of leaving private hospital cover after 2000:     
¾  Younger age  
¾  Having less financial assets and greater household debt in 2001 
¾  Taking no financial risks 
¾  Reporting a worsening of financial circumstances prior to 2001 
¾  Having a decrease in wages and increase in benefits 2001 to 2002 
¾  Being in an occupation other than professional  
¾  A regular smoker 
 
Variables with negligible effect on the probability of leaving private hospital cover 
after 2000 included having a disability or long-term health condition, number of 
children and self-assessed prosperity. 
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5. Conclusions 
Around half of the sample had private hospital cover in 2004, compared with 45% in 
the Australian population as whole. At least thirty-nine percent of the sample held 
private health insurance prior to 2000, compared with an actual insurance rate of 30% 
in the Australian population at that time. The higher insurance rate in the HILDA 
sample may indicate that initial and ongoing participation in the study is associated 
with a higher probability of purchasing private health insurance. 
As expected, age was found to be a very strong predictor of health insurance decisions 
related to the introduction of the Lifetime Health Cover policy. In the HILDA sample 
those who took up private hospital cover in 2000 as a response to Lifetime Health 
Cover had higher mean household wages than other insured groups. However in the 
multinomial probit model this effect disappeared after controlling for other factors. 
Instead it appeared that those who took up insurance in response to LHC were in fact 
somewhat less well-off than those who had already taken up insurance prior to the 
policy. This could be explained in part by the younger age of those who took 
insurance in response to LHC, who were mostly working age adults. This group may 
be at a stage where they have greater incomes on average, which are accompanied by 
greater financial demands than older respondents who were already insured. The 
multivariable analysis indicates that when comparing age peers in similar 
circumstances, those who were better off financially had already taken up insurance 
prior to the introduction of the policy. This could explain why those who took up PHI 
in response to the LHC policy deadline perceived they as less prosperous compared 
with those who had already purchased insurance. There is therefore some evidence 
that the LHC policy deadline succeeded in attracting more middle income earners 
among working age adults into PHI than previously. In many respects however, those 
who joined because of LHC were very similar to those who joined prior. The group 
who joined because of  LHC may have planned to purchase PHI at a later stage, and 
so were particularly motivated by the deadline to bring their decision forward and 
avoid a future penalty.   
The three major factors that affected the probability of joining after 2000 were age, 
number of children and country of birth. Young childless couples and those from a 
non-English speaking background represent a new demographic that was not inclined 
to purchase hospital cover prior to the introduction of the LHC policy. Like the LHC 
deadline group, those who purchased hospital cover after 2000 had fewer financial 
assets or financial commitments than those who had joined prior to the introduction of 
LHC. 
The characteristics of the group who have purchased hospital cover after 2000 
however, indicates that the ongoing effect of the policy has been to attract a larger 
share of younger childless couples or singles to purchase hospital cover, at least over 
the short-term. If the impact of LHC were a response to the deadline and advertising 
rather than the premium penalty (Ellis & Savage, 2005) then the rate of young people 
joining around age 30 should drop over time, as the memory of the 2000 campaign 
fades and the LHC premium penalty comes to be seen as the normal state of affairs.  
We found that declining financial circumstances were the major reason for dropping 
hospital cover since the introduction of the LHC policy. It has been suggested that 
disillusionment with the value of hospital cover is a major reason for dropping PHI  
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since 2000. Although we do not have information about when the recent leavers first 
purchased insurance, the younger age of the leavers indicates that many in this group 
may have taken up private hospital cover as a response to Lifetime Health Cover 
policy, but dropped  the cover because of financial difficulties rather than for any 
other reason.  
The inclusion of another round of Private Health Insurance questions in future waves 
of HILDA would help clarify many of these findings and answer further questions 
raised by this analysis. 
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Table 1: Distribution of private hospital cover choice categories in 
2004 (Wave 4) 
   N  Sample % 
Joined prior to lifetime health cover  3,539  38.5% 
Joined in 2000 in response to LHC  567  6.2% 
Joined after 2000   448  4.9% 
Left after 2000  424  4.6% 
Left prior to 2000  1,857  20.2% 




Table 2: Comparison of selected demographic, financial, family 














Prior  Never  Total 
N  3,539  567  448  424  1,857  2,361  9,196 
%  38.5%  6.2%  4.9%  4.6%  20.2%  25.7%  100.0% 
Mean age (years)  49.3  42.4  36.7  41.8  53.0  39.8  46.2 
Female (%)  55.0  50.8  55.4  55.2  54.8  51.3  53.7 
Major city (%)  63.7  62.3  69.2  59.2  46.0  51.9  57.1 
Couple with children  36.2  51.2  27.5  31.8  25.6  33.6  33.7 
Single no children  18.3  16.6  31.5  31.1  29.4  34.7  25.9 
Tertiary qualification 
(%)  27.7  34.7  32.8  16.8  8.8  13.1  20.3 
Smoker (%)  13.1  16.6  20.8  29.4  25.5  35.8  22.6 
Long term health 
problem/disability (%)  18.7  13.1  17.2  24.5  35.2  23.4  23.1 
Self-assessed health 
good or better (%)  87.9  88.9  92.1  85.6  74.9  81.2  83.7 
Born in Australia  79.2  77.4  70.8  79.3  77.8  71.7  76.5 
Self-reported finance 
worse prior 12 mths (%)  2.4  2.5  1.6  7.8  4.1  3.3  3.2 
Household wages ($)  $60,130  $70,241  $61,341  $46,763  $25,717  $32,599  $46,179 
Individual benefits  $1,886  $1,159  $1,995  $3,171  $5,787  $5,116  $3,523 
Change in house 
wages 2001-02 ($)  $345  $3,183  $6,939  -$4,576  -$297  $634  $559 
Change in household 
benefits 2001-02 ($)  $396  $307  -$553  $1,077  $628  $511  $452 
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Table 3: Goodness of fit summary for multinomial logit, and 
multinomial probit models  





N  8686  8686  8686 
Parameters estimated  345  345  359 
Log likelihood  -10187      -10254  -10222 
AIC       21063       21199  21161 
McFadden’s R-
square  0.2180  0.2128  0.2153 
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Table 4a: Characteristic of index individuals for Joined 2000 
Because of LH, Joined After 2000 and Left After 2000 and 
probabilities of each PHI choice 
Variable  LHC index individual  Joined After index 
individual 
Left After index 
individual 
Age  40 years old  29 years old  35 years old 
Sex  Male  Male  Female 
Region  Major city  Major city  Major city 
Relationship  Partner  Partner  Partner 
Disability  No disability  No disability  No disability 
Language  English only  English only  English only 
Occupation  Professional  Professional  Service worker 
Qualifications  Tertiary   Diploma  Diploma 
Country of birth  Australia  Australia  Australia  
Individual wages  $100,000  $60,000  $50,000 
Partner’s wage  Partner's wages $0  Partner's wages $60,000  Partner’s wages 
$70,000 
Individual benefit  $0  $0  $0 
Individual  financial 
assets 




No financial assets  No financial assets          $0 
Change in household 
wages 2001 to 2002 
$20,000 increase in 
household wages 
$25,000 increase in 
household wages 
$40,000 decrease in 
household wages 
Change in household 
benefits 2001 to 2002 
No change in household 
benefits 
No change in household 
benefits 
$10,000 increase in 
household benefits 
Change in household 
financial assets 2001 to  
2002 
$50,000 increase in 
household financial 
assets 
$40,000 increase in 
household financial 
assets 
No change in 
household financial 
assets 
Married previous 12 
mths 
Not recently married  Not recently married  Not recently married 
Family illness or injury 
previous 12 mths 
Recent family illness   Recent family illness  Recent family illness 
Lost a  job 
 Previous 12 mths 
Has not lost a job   Lost a job  Lost a job 
Financially worse 
previous 12 mths 
Not financially worse the 
last 12 mths 
Not financially worse the 
last 12 months 
Financially worse the 
last 12 mths 
No of resident children  1 child  No children  3 children 
Age of youngest 
resident child 
Youngest child 5-14 yrs    Youngest child < 5 yrs 
Regular smoker  Non-smoker  Non-smoker  Smoker 
Financial risk behaviour Takes average financial 
risks 
Takes average  financial 
risks 
Takes no financial risk 
Self-assessed 
prosperity 
Considers self very 
prosperous 
Considers self very 
prosperous 
Considers self poor 
Exercise 
 
Exercises 3 times weekly  Exercises less than  
weekly 
Exercises less than 
weekly 
Probabilities of each private health insurance choice alternative estimated from multinomial 
probit 
Joined Prior  0.555  0.443  0.252 
Joined because of LHC  0.380  0.081  0.012 
Joined After   0.039  0.409  0.004 
Left After  0.008  0.033  0.459 
Left Prior  0.007  0.020  0.247 
Never  0.010  0.015  0.012  
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Table 5: Change in probability of having Joined Because of LHC 
compared with having Joined Prior for changes in the levels of 
the LHC index individual. 









Female  Male  -0.042 
 
0.049 
No children  1 child  -0.032  -0.009 
3 children    -0.083  0.077 
Youngest Child < 5 yrs  Youngest Child 5-14   -0.041  0.047 
Age 50  Age 40  -0.081  0.115 
Age 32    0.026  -0.064 
Age 29#    -0.132  -0.132 
Regional Australia  Major city  0.034  -0.046 
Australian born Non-English 
speaking background 
Born Australia 






English speaking background 




Born Africa/Middle East Non-
English speaking background  




Wages $0  $100,000  -0.078  -0.146 
Wages $20000    -0.047  -0.102 
Wages $40000    -0.024  -0.066 
Wages $60000    -0.009  -0.037 
Wages $80000    -0.001  -0.016 
Wages $120000    -0.002  0.012 
Wages $140000    -0.006  0.024 
Wages $160,000    -0.011  0.034 
Partners wages $40,000    -0.018  0.037 
Partners wages $60,000  $0  -0.030  0.053 
Partners wages $80,000    -0.042  0.069 
Partners wages $100,000    -0.054  0.084 
Partners wages $120,000    -0.066  0.099 
Partners wages $140,000    -0.079  0.113 
Partners wages $160,000    -0.091  0.127 
Couple’s financial assets 
(neg) < -$20,000 




Couple’s financial assets 
(pos) $80,000-$100,000  




No family illness/disability   Recent family illness  -0.049  0.032 
Just married~  Not recently married  -0.145  0.048 
Just getting by financially  Very prosperous  0.076  -0.083 
Lost job last 12 months  Not lost job last 12 
months 
-0.080  0.040 
No exercise  3  times weekly  -0.070  0.050 
# Base = LHC Index no children 
~ Base = LHC Index age 32 no children 
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Table 6: Change in probability of having Joined After 2000 
compared with having Joined Prior for changes in the levels of 
the Joined After index individual. 











Born Asia/Oceania NESB  Aust ESB  0.238  -0.240 
Born Africa/Middle East NESB    0.120  -0.120 
Born Europe NESB    0.158  -0.158 
Australian born non-English speaking background  English speaking 
background  0.074  -0.084 
Disability or long-term illness  No disability  0.052  -0.045 
1 child  no children  -0.128  0.118 
Single ~  With partner  0.041  -0.027 
Age 25 years  age 29 years  -0.042  0.035 
Age 40 years   age 29 years  -0.275  0.200 
Age 50 years  age 29 years  -0.353  0.326 
positive financial assets $30-$40k 
no financial 
assets  -0.125  0.160 
positive financial assets > $50k    -0.183  0.237 
negative  financial assets < -$20k    -0.113  0.123 
Wages $0  $60,000  -0.027  -0.083 
Wages $40,000    -0.004  -0.025 
Wages $100,000    -0.003  0.033 
Wages $140,000    -0.013  0.056 
Wages $180,000    -0.025  0.078 
Wages $220,000    -0.038  0.100 
Partner’s wages $0  $60,000  -0.014  -0.090 
Partner’s wages $160,000    -0.037  0.095 
Increase benefits $10,000 2001 to 2002  No increase  -0.075  0.020 
Tertiary qualification  Diploma  0.037  -0.036 
school only  diploma  0.081  -0.080 
Manager  Professional  -0.043  0.047 
Trade    -0.062  0.024 
Service    -0.063  -0.002 
Clerk    -0.053  0.048 
Not lost job last 12 months  Lost job last 12 
months  -0.073  0.027 
Financially worse off last 12 months  Not financially 
worse last 12 
months  -0.120  0.032 
Takes high financial risks  Takes average 
financial risks  -0.010  0.020 
Takes no financial risks    -0.030  0.071 
No exercise  < 1 weekly  -0.064  0.062 
~ base = Index individual, partner’s wages $0   
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Table 7: Change in probability of having Left After 2000 for 
changes in the levels of the Left After index individual. 
Level  Reference level 











Born Asia/Oceania NESB  Born Australia 
English speaking   0.006 
Born Africa/Middle East NESB    0.051 
Wages $0  $50,000  -0.025 
Wages $20,000    -0.010 
Wages $80,000    -0.008 
Wages $120,000    -0.036 
Wages $160,000    -0.079 
Wages $200,000    -0.132 
No children  3 children  -0.008 
Single ~  With partner  0.032 
Professional  Service  -0.072 
Regional  Major city  -0.026 
Remote    -0.026 
Not lost job last 12 months  Lost job  -0.059 
Age 45 youngest child 5-15 years  Age 35 youngest 
child < 5 years 
-0.143 





Financial assets (neg) 
< -$20,000  
  0.138 
Financial assets $0     0.016 
Non-smoker  Smoker  -0.056 
No change in benefits 2001 to 
2002 
$10,000 increase  -0.049 
Not financially worse last 12 
months 
Financially worse   -0.161 
No change in household wages 
2001 to 2002 
$40,000 decrease   -0.037 
No (prospective) change in wages 
or benefits 2001 to 2002 






Exercise 3 times weekly  < 1 weekly  -0.057 
Takes average financial risk  Takes no financial 
risks 
-0.069 
Takes high financial risk    -0.050 
~ base = Index individual no children, no partner’s wages or financial assets  
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Figure 1 
 
Effect of age on the probability of Joined Because of Lifetime Health 



























Effect of age on the probability of Joined After 2000, all other 
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Figure 3 
Effect of age on the probability of Left After 2000, all other variables 
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